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The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions in 
training managers may have on their future performance.  We argue that training with an 
emphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) is good 
for technical posts but may also lead future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicit 
safeguarding, crowding out instinctive relational heuristics and signaling a “bad” human type to 
potential partners.  In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because of 
their diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set of 
cooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools.  We present tentative 
confirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the core 
courses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates.  
Controlling for the self-selected average quality of their students and some other schools’ 
characteristics, average salaries are seen to be significantly greater for schools whose core MBA 
courses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based on 
economics or technical disciplines. 
Keywords: evolutionary psychology, economics, management, relational heuristics, 
rationality, self-interest. 
JEL codes: A23, B41, D01, D87, M12, M51. 
1. Introduction 
The social model of managers contains a set of beliefs that influence their interpretation of 
the environment and the way they interact with others (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Instilling into 
them what to expect from human behavior therefore affects their ability to design and implement 
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effective cooperative strategies (Cyert and Williams, 1993).  This is precisely the rationale of a 
strand of literature criticizing the increasing influence of economics in managerial training 
(Goshal and Moran, 1996; Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005), and subsequent work contesting 
this argument (Williamson, 1996; Bazerman, 2005; Felin and Foss, 2009). 
Economics has long been subject to criticisms for its lack of realism and the subsequent 
damage to the quality of predictions (Lester, 1946). A more recent strand of critiques, however, 
has been phrased in terms of a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that exposure to self-interest 
assumptions would trigger self-interested behavior.  The argument is that behavioral assumptions 
in economics cause certain psychological biases that lead to opportunistic conduct.  Confirming 
this conjecture in the lab, several studies have observed that students of economics display 
greater selfishness (Carter and Iron, 1991) that inhibits cooperation (Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 
1993, 1996), leads them to free ride (Marwell and Ames, 1981; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998) and 
even makes them more corruptible (Frank and Schulze, 2000). Although more selfish students 
could be self-selecting into economics (Frank and Schulze, 2000; Frey and Meier, 2005), these 
results have been often interpreted as a symptom of how economics is instilling in students how 
they should behave (Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993, 1996). 
In the business area, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) analyze how economic assumptions could 
preclude cooperation within firms and hence condemn them as progressively uncompetitive.  
They argued that managers who presume their workers are distrustful would resort to 
hierarchical controls (fiat, monitoring, and piece rate pay) at the expense of alternative social 
controls.  This should result in more compulsory compliance and work-to-rule over voluntary 
effort (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Pfeffer, 1994). Additionally, workers would also tend to reciprocate 
by developing more subtle forms of opportunistic conduct (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Vazquez, 2004), 
which would in turn make managers intensify supervision (Strickland, 1958).  The process then 
becomes once again a self-fulfilling prophecy, since assuming self-interest and opportunism calls 
for managerial controls that stimulate the very same behavior they intend to prevent.  In the end, 
“the cost of removing these controls will grow until it is no longer an option for the 
organization” (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996, 27). 
All this literature reflects a main concern: assuming a single human type that will behave 
opportunistically when given the chance leads individuals to overemphasize the hazards of 
transacting. Thus, even if managers believed that most people are honest most of the time, 
training in economics would push them to design contracts and establish relations in general 
“just in case” (Vázquez, 2006; Willianson, 1993b, 1996). This may harm individuals trying to 
play a leadership and team-building role by crowding out their instinctive “relational heuristics”: 
the innate decisional mechanisms which have been hardwired in our minds in order to interact 
with other human beings, including an aptitude for mind-reading and empathic relations and the 
ability to infer intentions from facial and oral expressions (Arruñada, 2008). However, a 
calculative safeguarding approach to transacting does not necessarily entail bad managerial 
consequences; it depends on the type of tasks managers have to perform. We argue in this paper 
that economics may actually offer a good managerial education, but only for tasks in which 
performance is closely tied to one’s specific stock of quantitative tools and capacity to carry out 
objective calculations (production planning, financial assessment, venture capital, tax 
optimization, cost accounting, logistics or market research). 
Our argument does not therefore follow the economics-bashing literature, nor does it aim at 
defending economics from any academic conspiracy. Organizational phenomena are often   3
sufficiently complex to allow for militant views. Economists may certainly be responsible for the 
social consequences of economics and will be more successful once we find the way of applying 
economics successfully. We therefore offer a nuanced perspective that aims to throw some light 
on why and how human assumptions may make managers more effective. We suggest that 
educating managers requires instilling into them ambiguous and even contradictory assumptions 
of human nature, a perspective that is consistent with the existence of human relational heuristics 
and is better represented in the diversity of organization theories. In contrast, a more rigorous 
and unique version of human nature based on calculative “hyperrationality” may offer good 
training for relatively marginal and more technical staff but at the expense of crowding out 
relational heuristics, which are essential for successful performance in more integrative and 
central managerial posts.  
We test our arguments by showing with an econometric model how managers’ salaries are 
affected on average by the relative importance that alternative behavioral assumptions had in 
their graduate education.  As far as we know, this is the first empirical study to test the effect of 
alternative behavioral assumptions on performance.  Notice that the controversy about whether 
opportunism is an appropriate assumption has mainly consisted of theoretical exchanges (Tsang, 
2006), whereas most empirical work on the normative value of economics not only aimed at 
testing whether economic assumptions self-fulfill, but were also confined to experimental and 
case evidence (Frank and Schulze, 2000; Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993, 1996; Ferraro, 
Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section two presents the theoretical framework.  We start 
by describing the role that cognitive science grants to our relational heuristics with regard to 
human interaction.  A brief account on how economics and management theories address 
rationality and cooperation follows.  We use this background to build a testable hypothesis on the 
compatibility of both perspectives with the insights of cognitive science.  This leads to the 
empirical part of the paper:  Section three describes the data and presents the model, whereas 
section four discusses results.  Section five concludes. 
2. Relational heuristics in economics and management 
2.1. The role of relational heuristics in social exchange 
Recent developments in cognitive sciences have improved our understanding of social 
exchanges by throwing light on how we decide to cooperate and with whom. Experimental 
psychologists have proved, for instance, that human beings err systematically in simple logical 
problems and assess probabilities poorly.  This supports the view held by biologists that the 
human mind is economical, meaning it spends only those resources required to succeed in a 
given environment.  Thus, if we did not evolve into scientists, able to comply perfectly with 
mathematical logic and the laws of probability theory, it was not because we lacked mental 
computing power but because it would have been wasteful.  Our mind does not produce 
scientific solutions with general validity, but solutions that are good enough to master the local 
environment.   4
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) speak of an “ecological” rationality, which is economical not 
only because it is subject to constraints, but because it is well adapted to our ancestral 
environment.  We can thus explain not only why human rationality is bounded (Simon, 1957), 
but also why our daily conduct relies on instincts (Simon, 1962): modular decision systems 
which are better than mere calculative rationality on evolutionary recurrent tasks, such as 
recognizing objects, acquiring grammar, comprehending speech or—most importantly here—
cooperating with others (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994). Non-conscious processes in general 
constitute most of the electro-chemical activity in our brains (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 
2005, 18), and this fact is also at the root of why we are subject to continuous mental conflict 
(McClure et al.  2004). Our contradictory desires and beliefs are the result of evolutionary 
adaptation, since calculating the best tradeoff would have been inefficient in a context of scarce 
computational resources (Livnat and Pippenger, 2006). 
The need for individuals to cooperate (like physical functions such as sighting, recognizing 
or grabbing objects) therefore involved the development of instinctive solutions that can often 
lead individuals to apparently contradictory or incoherent behaviors. Evolution endowed humans 
with innate relational heuristics that help us discriminate partners by, for instance, interpreting 
intentions from others’ expressions and attitudes, paying special attention to cooperation-related 
information, or signaling our commitment toward principled behavior.  Other innate heuristics 
help us to enforce cooperation. The simplest are linked to genetic relatedness, which grounds 
cooperation between relatives.  The most complex are the instinctive systems that support 
cooperation between total strangers: Commitment strategies based on strong reciprocity (Fehr 
and Falk, 2002), the choice of partners upon instinctive heuristics designed to detect potential 
and real cheaters or generate empathic relations (Evans and Chang, 1998), a complex moral 
sense grounded on emotions that constantly extends its scope (Frank, 1988); a fondness of 
individuals for conformity with mainstream behavior in a group, as well as for discrimination 
against heterodox conduct or against those outside the group (Nicholson, 1997); the thirst for 
gossip (Dunbar, 1996); and a whole set of relational (mainly distributional) frameworks that are 
triggered by certain environmental circumstances, like serious exogenous risk (Fiske, 1991; 
Tooby, Cosmides and Price, 2006). 
Evolution has accordingly made us live in a permanent quarrel with ourselves, leading us to 
different behaviors depending on the particular traits of the interaction we are carrying out, the 
characteristics of our partners, or the actual context in which we interact with others.  In 
principle, we may lie, deceive or betray to further our long term interests.  We are apt to easily 
fall into self-deception because in a world of walking lie detectors, believing your own lies is 
often adaptive.  We even tend to unconsciously mimic basic feelings like anger, disgust, fear, 
joy, sadness or surprise to enhance our chances of cooperation with others.  But at the same time 
and for the same reason, natural selection installed cooperation and generosity in our minds.  Our 
first ancestors who were friendly, charitable and generous “prospered not by their own 
calculation but because the feelings made it worth their neighbors’ while to cooperate with them” 
(Pinker; 1997, 406).  We feel solidarity, sympathy, tolerance and trust toward not only our 
family, but also toward our “artificial relatives” whom we make by gathering information on 
who joins which groups or who resembles who.  And when our potential partners are total 
strangers, we use other relational heuristics based on guessing intentions. 
Results from agent-based simulations and experiments are consistent with this view. For 
instance, Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) showed that, by allowing players in a Prisoner’s   5
Dilemma game to interact for 30 minutes before playing, they could improve their predictions on 
who would cooperate and who would defect with regard to other studies without this 
experimental condition. Furthermore, other studies have repeatedly questioned the existence of a 
unique human type who behaves in a more or less honorable manner when confronting 
cooperative dilemmas.  Simulations have proved that populations often contain groups of 
individuals with different prevailing strategies of interaction (Dugatkin and Wilson, 1991; 
Aktipis, 2004).  Several experiments have also confirmed that a substantial proportion of 
individuals in a population is principled, whereas many others tend to free ride and shirk. 
Moreover, all of them may change their behavior, however, under the influence of institutional 
constraints and other circumstances, and in fact individuals do not cluster perfectly (Burton and 
Obel, 1988; Nagin et al., 2002; Kurzban and Houser, 2005).  The typology of human nature is 
therefore more complex, variable, context-dependent and ambiguous than Hobbesian or 
Rousseaunian simplifications embrace, and the arsenal of cooperative tools in our minds is much 
more diverse and sophisticated than mere calculative rationality. 
2.2. Rationality and cooperation in Economics and Management 
Business schools transmit two main sets of paradigms to future managers on decision-making 
and human interaction. The first is based on economics, which entails a unique description of 
human nature by which all humans are of the same type: hyperrational and self-interested.  The 
second paradigm is implicit in the managerial “jungle of theories,” and it conveys a plural and 
sometimes contradictory nature of human beings. 
Starting with economics, its most salient trait regarding human assumptions is its explicit, 
coherent and unified perspective on human nature.  According to economics, individuals 
maximize their utility, guided by their preferences and tastes and restricted by the information 
available.  Decision-making is therefore considered a production process that is subject to limited 
resources (Stigler, 1961).  This instrumental or calculative rationality has been challenged by 
those authors for whom human beings “satisfy” and operate under conditions of “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1957; Williamson, 1975, 1985).  Individuals would thus take decisions 
under the restrictions defined by their capacity to process information and by the complexity of 
the environment they live or work in.  Although considering a wider set of costs complicates the 
analysis, there is little today in mainstream economics against this idea.  Williamson’s bounded 
rationality does not accordingly entail a radical change with respect to the presence of costly 
information in economic analysis to the extent it is still grounded on conscious (i.e., rational) 
mental processes.  Hence, his claim on the rationalizing role of organizations, which is mostly 
absent from mainstream economics, is more helpful for understanding how organizations behave 
in the market than how individuals decide within organizations. 
Economics is also explicit and unambiguous about self-interest, which has generally been 
used together with an assumption of perfect information.  Both assumptions define a framework 
within which individuals always keep their promises.  However, when information is imperfect 
and unequally shared amongst participants, then the same assumption of self-interest leads to 
problems of non-fulfillment.  This situation has been labeled “opportunism” after Williamson 
(1975), who defines it as “self-interest seeking with guile,” i.e., an extreme form of self-interest 
which leads the parties to go further than they would through a more innocent form of self-  6
interested conduct (1985, 43-52 and 64-67).  Related concepts widely used in economics such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard, are simply a consequence of self-interested conduct in a 
context of asymmetric information. The change with respect to the purely neoclassical model 
does not therefore refer to the behavioral assumption but to the structure of available 
information. 
In contrast with economics, the reliance of management theories on different human 
assumptions and the implicitness of such assumptions trains students in several perspectives on 
rationality and cooperation.  Managerial training includes concepts such as “bureaucracy” and 
“Taylorism,” for instance, which instruct students on ideas of pyramidal authority, written rules, 
a clear description of job contents, specialization, impersonality or time and motion analysis. 
These transmit a rational optimizing perspective on organizational structures and productive 
systems. There is consequently an implicit message that indoctrinates students on the need to act 
rationally by adopting these rationalistic practices.  Simultaneously, however, other managerial 
theories like contingent or systems’ theories (Pfeffer, 1982) tell the same students that our 
societies and organizations are not actually systems running towards a steady state in a rational 
equilibrium.  In contradiction with what they have just studied about Taylor or Weber, they learn 
that there is no optimum strategy or structure.  They are furthermore taught that, in contrast with 
the implicit assumptions of Taylorism and Weberism, decision making is not mainly a “rational” 
process.  Decision making could actually be subject to cognitive restrictions (Cyert and March, 
1963) and is significantly affected by emotions (Argyris, 1957; Etzioni, 1988).  Often such a 
diverse message on rationality is even conveyed in the same management courses. 
Similarly, the perspective on human interaction implicitly transmitted by management 
theories shows a high diversity that often leads to contradictory perspectives.  Future managers 
learn from classics like Taylor, Fayol or Weber that piece rates, hierarchy and standardization are 
crucial not only to coordinate individuals but also to control their propensity to shirk.  
Conversely, they also learn from Human Relations Theory that individuals are influenced by 
social needs and not only by economic incentives, especially in advanced societies.  The message 
is that piece rates and many of the bureaucratic features are “dehumanizing” (Etzioni, 1971) and 
therefore harm workers’ motivation in terms of “disaffection” and “suspicion” (Dore, 1973).  
Treating workers’ productivity as if it was an engineering problem would therefore be a mistake.  
Humans actually show a complex hierarchy of needs (Herzberg, 1968) that involve individual 
and collective motivations.  The study of personality is thus very relevant (Hall and Lindzey, 
1970) because human diversity makes generalizations difficult.  And when it comes to foreseeing 
the opportunistic propensity of individuals, textbooks discussing intrinsic motivation (Deci and 
Ryan, 1985) and psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1989) warn future managers about the 
ambiguous consequences of their actions.  Again, the implicit message is that individuals are 
neither altruistic nor opportunistic; their propensity to shirk or to cooperate depends to a great 
extent on how they perceive they are being treated. 
2.3. Hypothesis 
By concentrating on a series of mechanical models under the assumptions of rationality and 
self-interest, economics instructs managers in specific modeling mechanisms to reach optimal 
solutions. This perspective stimulates their skills for technical tasks in which performance is   7
closely tied to one’s specific stock of quantitative tools and objective calculations. Posts in 
production planning, financial assessment, venture capital, tax optimization, cost accounting, 
logistics or market research might consequently involve “optimal tasks for optimizing 
managers”. Cognitive sciences, however, provide three interrelated reasons as to why training in 
economics can be bad for posts in which personal elements are crucial, such as those requiring 
trust, exercising leadership or building teams in a intendedly cooperative environment. 
First, economics indoctrinates future managers in a single human type characterized by 
individuals’ proclivity towards opportunistic conduct.  This not only means that type selection is 
disregarded as an interaction strategy but furthermore entails that relational heuristics, which 
have been evolutionarily developed to distinguish human types, are made superfluous for human 
interaction. 
Second, economics sees decision makers as traders and recommends them to align their 
incentives through a calculative and safeguard-optimizing contractual process.  However, in a 
world of instinctively rational individuals with different capacities for commitment, our innate 
ability to screen cooperators ex ante may be more efficient than explicit safeguarding.  
Moreover, regardless of whether our screening heuristics succeed, intensifying our rational 
safeguarding efforts may interfere with more emotional and definitely less conscious interaction 
mechanisms.  Transaction costs will then increase and trade opportunities will be jeopardized.  
This is what happens, for example, when, calculative safeguard-building provokes a sort of 
Eisenberg effect by activating automatic cheater detection mechanisms or hindering the 
development of empathy relations.  Parties who exhibit opportunistic assumptions thus risk being 
classified by potential partners as opportunistic, and may trigger non-cooperative first moves 
even in repeated games (Forges, 1992). 
Finally, emphasis on rationality and optimization leads to overapplication of economic 
calculus to morally-loaded issues. Hence, even if economics does not obviously encourage 
managers to act immorally, managers may be perceived as immoral when decision making is 
performed in inadvertent violation of social norms.  In so doing, managers tend to overlook 
relevant issues such as, for example, their partners’ desire for procedural and distributive justice 
(Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; McFarlin and Sweeney, 1992) which, despite being subject 
to cultural differences, also reflect hardwired instincts related to our conformity with mainstream 
ideologies, gregarious behavior, drive for status, loss aversion and many others (Pinker, 1997, 
Nicholson, 1997).  The fact is that people care deeply about being treated fairly, and managers 
depend on the approval of others to be successful.  By stressing strategies and reforms in an 
absolute sense, economics disregards how our hardwired instincts make us perceive them.  
Economics training may thus incline managers to explicitly apply cost and benefit analysis to 
issues which, for many people, should not be considered on such an economic basis or, at least, 
should not be explicitly considered on such a basis and which are inside an expanding and 
intuitively shared “moral circle” (Singer, 1981; Brown, 2000). Considering such issues in terms 
of economic tradeoffs is judged immoral by most people (Tetlock et al., 2000). The consequence 
is a tendency of economics-trained managers to inadvertently signal themselves as antisocial and 
immoral types, whatever their true type is in that particular context. 
To put it briefly, therefore, the normative explicitness on human behavior makes the whole 
contractual process a matter of ex ante rationalizing of ex post costs and benefits.  This is the 
reason why instructing managers explicitly on self-interest and opportunism may be positively 
right but normatively wrong: It advises individuals to perform a sophisticated fine-tuning of   8
hypocrisy that collides with our innate relational heuristics. The result is an increase in 
transaction costs (by provoking distrust among exchanging partners and confusion as to what 
good ex ante strategies are) that may delay, deteriorate, or even frustrate economic exchanges. 
Alternatively, the implicit and plural nature of human assumptions in management theories 
entails a more considered weight for rationality and opportunism, thus fostering the use of our 
adaptive relational heuristics to individualize each transaction and act accordingly. 
From this perspective, the debate about whether economics or management theories are 
epistemologically superior does not help much in assessing whether they serve for properly 
instructing future managers.  What matters most is their effect on the ability of future managers 
to employ their adaptive relational heuristics.  False beliefs are useful when they trigger adaptive 
behavior.  For example, regardless of whether believing in God is a scientific, rigorous 
deduction, beliefs in a punishing god may constitute an effective way of enforcing a moral code 
without relying on external enforcement.  Similarly, when interacting with people capable of 
identifying potential cheaters, self-deception may allow a cheater to pass undiscovered, and this 
may compensate for other costs imposed by self-deception.  By the same token, de-emphasizing 
opportunism may therefore be adaptive even if wrong if, for instance, it helps people to signal 
their cooperative nature and contract more often with cooperators.  Expectations of cooperation 
can thus become self-fulfilling.   
Moreover, the effect of relying on single and plural behavioral assumptions is reinforced by 
the predominant way in which both economics and management are taught. Economics mostly 
relies on deduction, which explicitly starts featuring the human assumption. Conversely, 
management education relies on induction, especially when using the case method, which allows 
for different emphases and starting points.  Students have to discuss—rather than calculate—
which conducts and decisions are more suitable in a particular situation, so they are confronted 
with the full array of human traits.  They are forced to focus on facts, but do so while interpreting 
factual situations and real human characters according to their own instinctive judgment 
(Greenhalgh, 2007).  Most cases allow different perspectives and do not even afford anything 
like a “solution.” Students also know that the situations they will have to navigate in the future 
will differ and will require attention to the full sets of facts and characters.  As summarized by 
Rubinstein (2006, c8) when criticizing the mathematical bias of economics, class discussion of 
case studies fosters more comprehensive thinking about real life problems and instills in students 
the need to balance conflicting interests. 
These arguments lend support for our proposition that, compared to the single human nature 
embedded in economics, the plural, implicit and sometimes even incongruent approach of 
management theories is thus better adapted to the nature of the cognitive problem of cooperation; 
a problem characterized by the intrinsic contradictions between selfishness and altruism, trust 
and suspicion, teamwork and shirking. 
Based on this support we propose the following hypothesis: Managers indoctrinated in 
rationality and opportunism are less valuable than managers whose training encourages the use 
of their innate relational heuristics.   9
3. Data and analysis 
We test this hypothesis by examining how the market for managers evaluates the influence of 
the alternative behavioral assumptions used in MBA programs on the earnings of their graduates.  
We measure professional success as the average weighted salary of each school, controlling for 
several other factors.  Data on the presence of different behavioral assumptions in each MBA 
program has been compiled by reviewing how each of their core courses was described in the 
programs’ websites during the month of February 2003.  In particular, the performance of each 
MBA program was estimated through its graduates’ average weighted salaries three years after 
graduation from the 2001, 2002 and 2003 Financial Times (FT) surveys.  These figures were 
given in US dollars and measured as the average “salary today” adjusted for salary variation 
between industry sectors (Salary).  Using salaries right after graduation should lessen the 
relevance of other alternative measures of managerial value like non-monetary rewards.  
Moreover, given a competitive labor market for MBAs, salaries will reflect the willingness of 
employers to pay for the attributes embodied in a program's graduates. 
Reliance on two different behavioral assumptions is measured through the weight of each 
assumption in the courses that form the mandatory core of each MBA curriculum.  This weight 
was based on the course content, as described in the respective MBA web site and after 
reviewing the recommended literature of the course where appropriate.  Whenever a course’s 
description suggested it was based on rational and self-interested agents, such as courses on 
economic theory and some dealing with strategy or finance (Rocha and Ghoshal, 2006, 586), it 
was classified as Economics. Whenever a course’s description revealed more plural assumptions, 
under which human conduct sometimes reflects opportunism and sometimes responds to 
altruistic or at least group-beneficial motives, such as Human Resources Management, 
Leadership or Organizational Behavior, it was classified as Management.  We have separated 
Ethics courses from the management field because they tend to recommend a more explicit and 
univocal strategy for exchange: “Being honest is profitable”.  To this extent, they might be 
moving individuals to cooperate in excess. (Econometric analysis using survey data supports that 
miscalibrating trust is costly in which ever direction, even if exceeding in mistrust is more costly 
than exceeding in trust [Butler, Giuliano and Guiso, 2009]). Other business ethics courses, which 
take a more calculative perspective on moral action, make the contractual process a matter of ex 
ante calculation of costs and benefits, as in economics. Results do not change, however, whether 
explicit ethics courses are included or not with other management courses.  Finally, technical 
courses that do not reveal a prominent behavioral assumption are taken as default.  This is the 
case, for example, of Statistics, Financial Accounting, Operations Management or Writing Skills.  
We take Technical courses as the default variable, with the sum of Economics, Management, 
Ethics and Technical variables equal to 100. 
The classification was performed by two raters. The comparison of these individual scores 
revealed rating differences in the courses with a “hybrid” set of behavioral assumptions—those 
which for some topics rely on economic theory and for others on other disciplines. For example, 
marketing courses often include an economics-based part dealing with distribution channels and 
pricing and a more psychological part dealing with advertising, consumer behavior and brand 
management. Rating discrepancies were discussed by the two raters in order to reach a 
consensual assessment.  The annex shows examples of how these classifications were performed 
for Harvard and Wharton.   10
To better identify the effect of the curriculum, the models control for several potential factors 
related to the inputs, process and environment of each school: the relative size of the MBA core, 
the influence of students’ quality, the value added by the MBA and the possible effect of local 
markets. 
The relative size of the MBA core (Core Weight) reflects the percentage of core courses in 
the total number of courses required for graduation. For 15 schools the total number of courses 
was imputed from the data. Results do not substantially change when these observations are not 
used. 
Students’ quality is considered both in terms of their previous work experience and potential 
academic performance.  Previous work experience of the students is measured through the 
number of months they had been working before entering the MBA (Experience).  Their 
academic quality, on the other hand, is proxied through the average score obtained in the 
Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT).  Notice, however, that the use of this variable 
as provided by the FT generates an endogeneity problem in our model.  We expect higher GMAT 
scores to be associated with higher salaries, but we also expect that good students, those with the 
best GMAT scores, will tend to have gone to the best schools.  Therefore, their average quality 
will also depend on the school’s average expected salaries.  This is why both variables are 
treated as endogenous.  The second equation in our model seeks to obtain the predicted values of 
GMAT according to several explanatory variables.  These predicted values of GMAT are the ones 
actually used in estimations (3) and (4) explaining average salaries. 
The value added by the MBA is measured through several variables: the total cost of the 
MBA in tuition and living expenses, the duration of the program, the size of the students’ body at 
each school, the homogeneity of students, the quality of research and a rank measure of each 
program reputation.  The annual budget recommended for attending the program (Budget) 
includes tuition fee and living expenses in US dollars.  Social interaction, often considered a 
value for this kind of program, both in itself and in terms of future professional networking, is 
proxied via the total number of full-time MBAs in the school (Enrollment).  The homogeneity of 
students (Table A.1) is measured by an index (Homogeneity), built as the first principal 
component of three variables measuring the dispersion of students with respect to their GMAT 
score (Gmatdisp), age (Studentage~p) and previous work experience (Workexpdisp).  Each of 
these three variables was calculated by dividing the difference from the lower to the upper 80% 
bounds of the corresponding score by the average score for each school.  The impact of Research 
is measured with an index obtained through principal component analysis (Table A.2) from three 
indicators given by the FT survey.  These indicators are: the percentage of faculty with a 
doctorate (Faculdoct); a ranking based on the number of doctoral graduates from the last three 
academic years, with additional weighting for those graduates taking up a faculty position at one 
of the top 50 schools in the 2002 survey (Doctorrank); and a ranking of research based on a 
rating of faculty publications in 40 international academic and practitioner journals, with points 
accrued to the school at which the author is currently employed and points adjusted by faculty 
size (Researchrank).  Research is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. 
Lastly, we include the ranks of the schools to consider the influence of program reputation on 
salary variation (Rank). 
The effect of local markets is controlled by the schools’ geographic area, which is considered 
through two dummies, USA and Europe.  Both take value one if the school is located there, and 
zero otherwise.  Finer geographical proxies do not modify our results.   11
Finally, three additional variables are used as instruments to tackle the endogeneity problem 
caused by GMAT: the performance of placement services, the gender position and the 
internationalization of business schools.  The performance of placement services is measured 
with the Placement variable, i.e., the percentage of 1999 alumni that gained employment with the 
help of career advice.  Given that in the 2003 survey this data is presented as a rank, the variable 
is recoded as a reverse ranking to make higher numbers represent better quality.  Gender position 
is measured through the Feminine index (Table A.3), built as the first principal component of the 
percentages of female faculty (Womenfacul), female students (Womenstud) and female board 
members of each school (Womenboard).  Similarly, the International index (Table A.4) 
combines the percentages of foreign faculty (Intlfaculty), foreign students (Intlstudent) and 
foreign board members (Intlboard), as well as indexes of students’ mobility (Intlmobility) and 
international exposure (Intlexperr~k), plus the working languages required (Languages).  
Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics of the variables and shows that the dataset 
combines data from two main sources: the Financial Times 2003 survey of the best MBA 
programs, mostly based on 2002 data (Financial Times, 2003), and the profiles of each program 
in the Business Week database (Business Week, 2002; Merritt, 2002).  For a few observations, 
part of the data was collected from the programs’ websites at the beginning of 2003.  All five 
indices used (Research, Homogeneity, Placement, Feminine and International) are standardized 
to have mean zero and standard deviation one.  Table A.5 presents the correlations among the 
variables in our models. 
Table 2 presents the econometric analysis. We have estimated two models and the Table 
presents two specifications, showing results with and without non significant parameters.  The 
first model is an OLS estimation of the average salary earned by the graduates of each MBA as a 
function of behavioral assumptions (Economics and Management), and the control variables.  
The second model, which renders similar results, tries to deal with the possible endogeneity of 
student quality through a system of simultaneous equations estimated using three-stage least 
squares (3SLS).  Thus, we propose in the second equation that average student quality depends 
on the school’s average salary, the performance of its placement services, its research quality, 
student homogeneity and the position of the school in terms of gender and international 
background. 
We thus posit a simultaneous and reciprocal influence between GMAT and Salary.  The 
higher the average GMAT of each MBA program, the higher the potential of its students to 
achieve outstanding results after they graduate.  Yet, since average salaries are made public 
through sources like FT, MBAs whose graduates are successful in terms of remuneration will 
also attract more and better students, among whom business schools will choose the best 
qualified (those with a higher GMAT).  We therefore argue that there is a matching of schools 
and students.  This is the justification for the presence of Salary as the dependent variable in the 
first equation and as an independent variable in our second equation.  Other variables included in 
this second equation have already been described: the performance of the placement services, 
student homogeneity regarding GMAT, age and work experience, the performance of schools’ 
research, gender position and internationalization of the faculty.   12
4. Results and discussion 
Results confirm our main argument because the greater the weight of Management courses 
the greater the average salary of the school.  For 1% more weight of management in the MBA 
core, MBA graduates earn around 1,000 USD more. However, no significant relation appears 
between average salaries and the percentage of Economics and Ethics courses. Thus, the model 
supports the hypothesis that MBA graduates who have taken a higher percentage of management 
courses are more valued than their colleagues who have taken a higher proportion of subjects 
based on economic and technical assumptions, as well as explicit courses on ethics (no 
significant difference is noted between economics, ethics and technical courses).  These results 
do not significantly change with alternative measures of success taken from the FT survey, such 
as the extent to which alumni fulfilled their goals, the degree to which alumni recommend 
recruitment from each school, and several other measures that were calculated three years after 
graduation: the simple average of salaries, the percentage increase in salary, the rate of return for 
each dollar spent and the degree to which alumni have moved up the career ladder. 
Incidentally, the Core Weight coefficient is significant and positive, which suggests that 
MBA programs with a higher proportion of core courses yield a better education for future 
managers.  This result is consistent with the presence of conflicting interests between students 
and professors.  Professors, being interested in more specialized and scientific courses, may tend 
to impose cores that are too small, probably leading to incoherent learning, and too many courses 
that rely on allegedly more scientific, but managerially unproductive, behavioral assumptions.  In 
the light of this result, recent switches to smaller cores by some top schools may be misguided. 
Other control variables yield the expected results.  Both GMAT and Experience augment the 
success of the MBA program.  As expected, smarter and more experienced students “teach” their 
classmates better.  Budget, which measures the cost of the investment in each MBA, also shows 
a positively significant correlation with average salary, which proxies the gross return from the 
investment.  The Enrollment coefficient, on the other hand, suggests there is a positive relation 
between the average salary of the MBA program and its visibility in the labor market, perhaps 
through brand positioning, graduate associations, social interaction during the MBA and 
networking resources for the future.  Also as expected, students’ homogeneity has a detrimental 
effect on salaries. Finally, graduates from the USA and Europe also earn more than their 
counterparts on Asian and Australian programs.  As shown in Table 2, graduates from the USA 
earn between 12,099 and 13,844 more dollars than Asian-Australian graduates.  European 
graduates, in turn, earn between 9,339 and 11,322 more.  It is worth recalling here that the school 
location dummies were meant to control for the effects of local markets. Performance differences 
stemming from location may therefore tell us not so much about the quality of schools but rather 
about, among other issues, graduates being more inclined to stay in the country from which they 
graduate, which may furthermore show a lower cost of living (thus leading to a lower average 
wage). 
The estimation is less clear about two variables Duration and Research, which present 
insignificant coefficients.  Within our framework, it could be argued that a lengthier education 
can enhance the analytical capacity of graduates but adds little to managerial abilities.  The 
insignificant coefficients of Research are also consistent with an interpretation that the market is 
asking MBA programs to generate the proper competences, capacities and abilities in their 
graduates, regardless of whether the information they receive is at the edge of scientific   13
knowledge.  This would be consistent with the emphasis of MBA programs on teaching 
(Trieschmann et al., 2000). 
We interpret these results as supportive that, because management theories are less dogmatic, 
more open, more descriptive and sometimes even inconsistent among the different branches, they 
are more coherent with what cognitive science shows is normal human behavior: diverse and 
contradictory.  This interpretation is consistent with previous finding that managers trained in 
business schools that rely more on the case study method also earn more money (Tracy and 
Waldfogel, 1997).  Also with the argument put forward by Ghoshal and Moran (1996, 39): by 
assuming the worst, managers indoctrinated in economics could be bringing out the worst in 
economic behavior.  Managers with training in management theories not only appreciate the 
value of contractual safeguards but, more importantly, can discriminate in which relational 
frameworks they should apply them.  
Our argument suggests that indoctrination in rationality and self-interest may be harmful in 
jobs requiring a full set of human abilities, but not in all jobs.  A curriculum loaded with 
economics might make MBA graduates more analytical, which can be an excellent skill in many 
staff and technical posts. In such posts, even if personal interactions with others play a role, 
performance hinges more on one’s specific stock of quantitative tools and capacity to carry out 
objective calculations as, for instance, in production planning, financial assessment, tax 
optimization, cost accounting, logistics or market research. Economics can therefore offer a 
better education than management for many jobs. But any attempt to widen the scope of 
economics education for leadership tasks requires, as a necessary condition, adapting economics 
principles to the particular traits of the transactions at stake. This may be a fruitful exercise if 
psychology and sociology insights are incorporated in economics reasoning, as for example in 
Baron and Kreps (1999) and Cowen (2007). It may not be sufficient, however, to the extent that 
rational calculation may crowd out more effective (“better-than-rational”) heuristics.  
The point is that managers do not only play a technical role—they are actually above 
technical jobs in terms of both hierarchy and salary.  To perform successfully, they need to deal 
with personal relations and politics, requiring an extensive use of heuristics.  This explains why 
courses based on plural and implicit human assumptions can help managers to deal with their 
workers, suppliers or clients: such courses do not interfere with managers’ relational heuristics.  
On the contrary, they encourage their use to instinctively characterize each interaction and each 
partner, and to act accordingly.  They do not indoctrinate individuals to presume their 
counterparts are opportunistic.  Managers whose education has been based on management 
theories do not therefore tend to engage in safeguarding activities that often risk intensifying 
distrust among potential partners.  And finally, management courses do not propose ex ante 
calculation of optimum safeguards that would damage managers’ relational capital by making 
them neglect the hardwired instincts of their partners.  Their cost-benefit analyses can therefore 
include a much wider range of considerations. 
Our results may well be consistent with other explanations. For instance, it is possible that 
students self-select into business schools according to students’ and schools’ characteristics and 
that the observed differences in schools’ average salaries are caused by unobserved students’ 
characteristics (e.g., sociability) which are also driving their choice of school.  In other words, 
more sociable students would choose schools with less economics in their curricula and will 
succeed professionally not because there they have less training in economics but because they 
started graduate school with better social skills.  We find this explanation unsatisfactory,   14
however, because according to survey evidence the choice of school is driven by other factors, 
such as prestige and global recognition, career options the school affords or quality and 
reputation of faculty (Punj and Staelin 1978; Chapman, 1998). 
We also find unlikely that remaining differences in salaries could be explained by a 
perception or reputational argument, according to which company hiring practices would be 
based on the fact that an MBA from a top school is worth paying more for than one from a lower 
ranked school, regardless of the type of courses each school provides. Most of these effects 
should be captured by our control variables. Furthermore, several surveys conducted by the 
Graduate Management Admission Council suggest that companies are clear about where to 
recruit: what they expect from an MBA is based on experiential factors (the success of alumni 
hired by the recruiters’ companies and their own experiences recruiting at the school), school’s 
curriculum, quality of faculty, and their ability to produce candidates with leadership potential 
and communication skills (Olkin, 2004; GMAC, 2007, 2008). 
Finally, our results could also be consistent with a human capital explanation. Given that our 
wage data refers to starting salaries, the observed difference could be a consequence of managers 
with more economic training being hired for positions that in their first years compensate them 
relatively more in human capital. Testing this and many other explanations remains for future 
work. For the time being, the mere possibility of these alternative explanations does not, 
however, refute our argument that economics training may be having negative effects on some 
management abilities that are crucial for leadership and team building posts. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Humans interact by applying a nuanced mixture of decisional mechanisms: innate heuristics, 
learned cultural practices and conscious rational thinking, and some mechanisms may collide and 
provoke conflict.  Assuming that human behavior is decided by only one of these mechanisms 
may be a necessary simplification in many scientific endeavors.  Believing such an assumption, 
however, can lead us to implement wrong relational strategies in social and economic exchanges.  
Top managers are no exception. Like most humans, they are not highly reflective, strategic, 
rational, top-down planners (Mintzberg, 1973).  They certainly think and plan, but usually on the 
run while they are fighting fires stemming from above, below, left and right. Thus, when 
indoctrination leads managers to overemphasize their analytical competences and presume all 
their counterparts are not trustworthy, they risk engaging in an intense safeguarding activity that 
interferes with these less “rational” and more “emotional” interaction mechanisms. This will 
often trigger distrust in their partners; delaying, worsening or even precluding valuable 
transactions.  By contrast, when indoctrination in human assumptions pushes managers to use 
their relational heuristics in their daily interaction with their workers, suppliers and clients, 
cooperation strategies are often more successful.  Our results, showing that graduates from 
management-oriented MBAs earn about USD 1,000 more a year for each 1% more weight of 
management courses in the program, are consistent with this view. 
It is worth emphasizing that an analytical education based on rationality and self-interest is 
not necessarily wrong. The point is that although calculative safeguarding may play an important 
role in specific transactions, economic agents need to consider its tricky interaction with 
automatic relational heuristics. Hence, whereas economics may offer a good education for less   15
personal tasks, it may harm individuals playing a leadership role.  MBA programs with a higher 
proportion of courses using management theories may therefore be producing more valuable 
managers not because of the epistemological quality of these theories but because their courses 
present a less dogmatic, more descriptive and diverse set of human assumptions. This probably 
helps the task of future managers when they need to identify the pertinent relational framework, 
therefore encouraging a contingent—and more successful—approach to economic and social 
interaction.  Such tasks are at least not hindered by management theories. These not only handle 
concepts related to rationalistic opportunism but also involve others like trust, intrinsic 
motivation, ethical values or, more generally, emotions, which do not interfere with the adaptive 
nature of our relational heuristics. 
Our results also hold important implications for contract theory, changing the nature of the 
contracting problem with respect to its common paradigm.  If, as suggested by Stigler and 
Becker (1977), there were a single type of human beings prone to moral hazard or opportunism, 
the recipe would consist of designing incentive alignment mechanisms or, in Williamson’s 
broader terms, “farsighted contracting.”  However, if there are actually several human types (and 
not humans with different reputations, as in Williamson, 1996, 13-14) or, if these types are 
context-dependent, so that individuals can be assumed to be “programmed” to respond 
differently depending on the particular situation and partners they face, then the main challenge 
in contracting is not necessarily to protect parties against opportunism but to discriminate 
potential partners and contracting situations in order to display a different relational strategy in 
each transaction.  General, indiscriminate application of “farsighted contracting” or “incentive 
mechanism” designs is consistent with a world of identical individuals.  It is not consistent, 
however, with a world in which individuals are endowed with an arsenal of instinctively 
cooperative commitments and type identifiers. 
Finally, a by-product of our analysis is that it challenges the role of scientific knowledge and 
the relative importance of formal and informal education for all sorts of human interaction.  It 
even holds an intriguing prospect for the relative value of social science and mere social 
knowledge.  Specifically, it limits the application of rationality and self-interest assumptions to 
the normative area of individual decision-making, including not only management but also 
contracting and policymaking.  It may even explain why the application of economic analysis to 
these normative areas has been less clear, since success in such areas probably does not depend 
on an epistemological judgment but on adaptation.  Hence, in the normative area, economics and 
all other theories that explicitly rely on rationality and self-interest may be weak even if they 
provide the greatest explanatory power—normative success requires functional adaptation and 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the top 100 MBA programs 
Variable Source  Obs  Mean  Std.    Dev.  Min  Max 
Salary  FT 98  101386.4  27245.78  31184  176231 
Economics  Built from MBA’s Websites  98  35.40054  8.629844  16.66667  54.54546 
Management  Built from MBA’s Websites  98  14.626  5.771738  0  27.27273 
Ethics  Built from MBA’s Websites  98  .0189111  .030365  0  .0909091 
Core Weight  Built from MBA’s Websites  98  60.13617  15.34357  27.27273  100 
GMAT  BW and Websites  98  648.9388  35.80397  557  723 
Experience  BW 98  62.71429  13.30917  25  98 
Budget  BW 97  34696.64  13527.68  4000  60000 
Duration  BW 98  18.17347  3.763705  10  24 
Enrollment  BW 98  378.0918  326.8504  26  1805 
Homogeneity  Index built from BW data  98  0  1  -3.012106  2.099959 
Research  Index built from FT data  98  0  1  -3.020171  1.829468 
Rank  FT 98  --  --  1  98 
USA  FT 98  .5816327  .4958273  0  1 
Europe  FT 98  .244898  .4322376  0  1 
Placement  FT 98  0  1  -1.705162  1.703757 
Feminine  Index built from FT data  98  0  1  -2.155211  2.991765 
International  Index built from FT data  98  0  1  -1.699146  3.03801 
Faculdoct  FT 98  87.29592  18.70344  0  100 
Doctorrank  FT 98  46.64286  27.32328  1  81 
Researchrank  FT 98  49.44898  28.54012  1  95 
Gmatdisp  Built from BW data  98  .1863082  .0531585  .0847458  .3442623 
studentage~p  Built from BW data  98  .2780801  .1027466  .1071429  .7931035 
Workexpdisp  Built from BW data  98  1.216132  .5233243  .3225806  3.84 
Womenfacul  FT 98  20.66327  6.693502  0  36 
Womenstud  FT 98  28.46939  7.401872  13  56 
Womenboard  FT 98  14.61224  9.450503  0  50 
Intlfaculty  FT 98  30.89796  19.46103  2  98 
Intlstudent  FT 98  43.59184  21.21215  11  96 
Intlboard  FT 98  19.64286  23.03617  0  95 
Intlmobility  FT 98  48.96939  29.06851  1  100 
Intlexperr~k  FT 98  49.70408  27.97171  1  98 
Languages  FT 98  .1734694  .431385  0  2 
Notes: FT: Financial Times’ MBA ranking, 2003; BW: Business Week’s MBA Profiles, 2002. 
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Table 2. Relation between behavioral assumptions used in the core courses of the top 100 MBA 
programs and their graduates’ average salary 
 
Systems of simultaneous 
equations (3SLS) 
Variables 
Single equation model (OLS) 
Dependent variable: 
 Salary  Salary equations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
104.27   62.54    Economics  (% of courses based on self-





***  Management (% of courses based on “plural” 
human assumptions in MBA core)  (209.67) (196.91) (200.87) (191.56) 
20541.52   16,443.83    Ethics (weight of a Business Ethics course in 





***  Core Weight (% of compulsory courses in 
total number of courses required for the 
MBA) 





***  GMAT (average score of each school’s 





***  Experience (average work experience of the 





***  Budget (annual USD expenditure during the 
MBA, including tuition and living costs)  (.1) (.1) (0.10) (0.09) 
58.98   -34.56    Duration (normal time length of the MBA, in 





**  Enrollment (total number of MBA full time 





***  Homogeneity (index of students homogeneity 
in GMAT, age and work experience)  (1308.26) (1296.44) (2,223.57) (2,040.27) 
-2082.80   -2,503.53    Research (performance index of the schools’ 
research)  (1444.67)   (1,438.67)   
-428.99
*** -401.69
*** -254.04    Rank (MBA position in the Financial Times 





***  USA (dummy variable = 1 for USA schools; 





***  Europe (dummy variable = 1 for European 






  (40805.64) (40753.28) (85,420.24) (57,184.34) 
R-squared  0.8960 0.8921 0.8234 0.8229 
Table continues in next page  
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Table 2. Relation between behavioral assumptions used in the core courses of the top 100 MBA 
programs and their graduates’ average salary (continued) 
     GMAT equations 
     (3)  (4) 
   -0.00    Salary (average weighted salaries of each 
school, three years after graduation, in USD)     (0.00)  
   -0.86
*** -0.87
***  Rank (MBA position in Financial Times 
ranking)     (0.17)  (0.08) 
   3.55    Placement (performance index of the 
schools’ placement services)      (2.96)  
   7.56
*** 7.63
***  Homogeneity (index of students homogeneity 
in GMAT, age and work experience)      (2.24) (2.20) 
   2.09    Research (performance index of the schools’ 
research)     (2.66)  
   -2.78  -3.16
**  Feminine (index measuring feminine 
presence in the school)      (2.02) (1.39) 
   -5.53
** -7.02
***  International (index measuring school’s 
internationalization)     (2.34) (1.73) 
Constant     704.51
*** 691.26
*** 
     (24.24) (4.20) 
R-squared     0.6334  0.6327 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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7. Annex 
Table A.1. Principal components analysis used to build the Homogeneity index 
Component Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.76587  0.99975  0.5886  0.5886 
2 0.76613  0.29813  0.2554  0.8440 
3 0.46800  .  0.1560  1.0000 
Eigenvectors:      
Variable 1  2  3   
Gmatdisp  0.51138 0.80374 0.30411   
studentage~p  0.63774 -0.11775 -0.76120   
Workexpdisp  0.57600 -0.58321 0.57280   
 Scoring  coefficients      
Variable 1       
Gmatdisp  0.51138      
studentage~p  0.63774      
Workexpdisp  0.57600      
Table A2. Principal components analysis used to build the Research index 
Component Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.54898  0.68733  0.5163  0.5163 
2 0.86165  0.27229  0.2872  0.8035 
3 0.58936  .  0.1965  1.0000 
Eigenvectors:      
Variable 1  2  3   
Faculdoct  -0.58299 0.55703 0.59147   
Doctorrank  0.48575 0.82251 -0.29584   
Researchrank  0.65129 -0.11484 0.75009   
 Scoring  coefficients      
Variable 1       
Faculdoct  -0.58299      
Doctorrank  0.48575      
researchrank  0.65129       
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Table A3. Principal components analysis used to build the Feminine index 
Component Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.43268  0.44317  0.4776  0.4776 
2 0.98951  0.41170  0.3298  0.8074 
3 0.57781  .  0.1926  1.0000 
Eigenvectors:      
Variable 1  2  3   
Womenfacul  0.66583 -0.32393 0.67211   
Womenstud  0.25157 0.94555 0.20651   
Womenboard  0.70241 -0.03158 -0.71107   
 Scoring  coefficients      
Variable 1       
Womenfacul  0.66583      
Womenstud  0.25157      
Womenboard  0.70241      
Table A4. Principal components analysis used to build the Internationalization index 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative     
1 2.97799  2.05724  0.4963  0.4963     
2 0.92075  0.21422  0.1535  0.6498     
3 0.70652  0.07609  0.1178  0.7675     
4 0.63043  0.19332  0.1051  0.8726     
5 0.43711  0.10989  0.0729  0.9455     
6 0.32721  .  0.0545  1.0000     
Eigenvectors:        
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intlfaculty  0.36063 0.48604 -0.59956 0.34175 -0.38227 0.10635 
intlstudent  0.47198 0.22145 0.24096 -0.25833 0.31544 0.70986 
Intlboard  0.45124 -0.06923 0.07919 0.54182 0.59431 -0.37222 
intlmobility  -0.42727 -0.33467 -0.41510 0.38916  0.31777  0.52981 
Intlexperr~k  -0.35413 0.45730 0.58073 0.53263 -0.14454 0.15373 
Languages  0.36824 -0.62355 0.25813 0.29624 -0.52848 0.20471 
 Scoring 
coefficients 
     
V a r i a b l e   1        
Intlfaculty  0.36063       
intlstudent  0.47198       
Intlboard  0.45124       
intlmobility  -0.42727       
Intlexperr~k  -0.35413       
Languages  0.36824        
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Salary  1                    
Economics  . 1 5   1                   
Management  .28
***  . 0 6   1                  
Ethics  -.01 -.15 -.35
***  1                 
Core Weight  -.05  -.11  -.03  .09  1               
GMAT  .70
*** .21
**  -.06  .05  -.14  1              
Experience  .01 .14 .21
** -.13  .07  -.17
*  1              
Budget  .66
***  -.03  .02 .14 -.10  .50
***  - . 0 8   1             
Duration  .13 -.22
** -.29




*  1            
Research  .42





***  1           
Enrollment  .73
*** .17
*  .11 .04 -.08  .61
*** -.15  .58
*** .23
*** .51
***  1          
Homogeneity  .38
***  .15 .01 .04 .07 .52
*** .06  .31
*** .14  .22
** .27
***  1         
Rank  -.81
***  -.05 -.05 -.04 .06  -.73





***  1        
USA  .38
*** -.09  -.22









***  1      
Europe  -.12 -.01 .33







*** -.07  .16
* -.68 1       
Placement  .57








*** .51  -.39
*** 1     
Feminine  -.25
***  .01 .08 -.15  .01 -.21
** .09  -.15  -.29
***  -.01 -.15 -.21
** .18
* -.21
** .14  -.14  1   
International  -.10 .04  .20
** -.11  .30
*** -.18
* .31
*** -.12  -.62  -.38
***  -.10 -.05 -.00 -.76
*** .67
*** -.26
*** .06  1 
* Significance at 10 percent level. 
** Significance at 5 percent level. 
*** Significance at 1 percent level 
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Table A6. Examples of course classification 
Content Course  Description 
Economics (100%)  “Managerial 
Economics” 
(Wharton) 
This course deals with applying microeconomic theory to the management of the firm in markets where the firm possesses 
market/monopoly power. Sophisticated pricing policies, transfer pricing, strategies in dealing with competitor firms, cooperation 
strategies, managing under uncertainty, asymmetric information, auctions and externalities will be covered. The course will 
concentrate on the way that microeconomics may be utilized to enhance decision making within the manager's organization. The 
student will develop an understanding of the economic environment in which the firm operates and how to think strategically within 
it. Students who have earned a B or better in an intermediate microeconomics and/or managerial economics course in the last seven 








This course focuses on how managers become effective leaders by addressing the human side of enterprise.  The first modules 
examine teams, individuals, and networks in the context of: (1) The determinants of group culture. (2) Managing the performance of 
individual subordinates. (3) Establishing productive relationships with peers and seniors over whom the manager has no formal 
authority.  The intermediate modules look at successful leaders "in action" to see how they: (1) Develop a vision of the future. (2) 
Align the organization behind that vision. (3) Motivate people to achieve the vision. (4) Design effective organizations and change 
them to achieve superior performance. (5) The final module introduces a model for strategic career management. 
Ethics (100%)  “Ethics and 
Responsibility” 
(Wharton) 
Ethics and Management considers the ethical responsibilities of managers and corporations. It examines difficult ethical conflicts 
and dilemmas. It does not attempt to convert sinners to saints, preach absolute truths, or deter the morally vulnerable. A successful 
module help students anticipate issues they will confront in their business career, and become clearer about how they think such 
issues should be resolved. Class sections consist of collaborative case discussions, exercises, and discussions of theoretical 
frameworks. By the time students have completed the module, they should have: (1) Improved their individual and group skills in 
identifying and analyzing ethical issues they will face as managers. (2) Become acquainted with common frameworks for exploring 
issues in business ethics, and learned to develop action plans that resolve ethical conflicts and dilemmas. (3) Discovered and learned 
to identify common patterns of success and failure in corporate ethics. (4) Become clearer about where they stand personally about 
critical ethical issues confronting managers. 




This course enables students to develop the skills and concepts needed to ensure the ongoing contribution of a firm's operations to its 
competitive position. It helps them to understand the complex processes underlying the development and manufacture of products as 
well as the creation and delivery of services. Topics encompass: (1) Process analysis, (2) Cross-functional and cross-firm 








The primary objective of this course is to introduce you to the concepts and theories underlying marketing decision making. 
Marketing 622 builds upon Marketing 621 with a stronger emphasis on the strategic considerations that drive and integrate the 
decisions made for each element of the marketing mix. Principal topics include resource allocation, market entry/exit decisions, and 
competitive analysis. In addition to a mix of cases and lectures, the course relies on a comprehensive computer simulation game that 
helps highlight these issues and provides the class with a rich set of realistic examples for discussion and analysis. This game allows 
students to appreciate the real power and value of marketing concepts, develop a disciplined approach to the analysis of marketing 






This course examines the role of finance in supporting the functional areas of a firm, and fosters an understanding of how financial 
decisions themselves can create value. Topics covered include: (1) Basic analytical skills and principles of corporate finance. (2) 
Functions of modern capital markets and financial institutions. (3) Standard techniques of analysis, including capital budgeting, 
discounted cash flow valuation, and risk analysis. 
 